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Introduction   
Since Woodrow Wilson the promotion of democracy has developed into a cornerstone of 
American foreign policy and earned a secure place in Western priorities. After the Cold War 
the United States took upon the role as the leader of the democratic world. The democratic 
peace theory became a hot topic in political science and made eventually made its way into 
the National Security Strategy of President Bill Clinton. The democratic peace is the name for 
the post-World War regularity of democratic regimes not fighting other democratic regimes.  
Supporters of the democratic peace theory believe that increasing the number of democratic 
states would eventually mean a more stable world, enlarging the zone of peace. This belief is 
grounded in the promotion of democracy around the world, and nestled itself in a political 
policy as democratization policy. The spread of the ideas of democratic peace and 
democratization policies have become more evident in the West. Democratization policies are 
common in important western institutions as the United States, the North-Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), and the European Union (EU)
1
. All three are established on 
democratic values and are active promoters of democracy.  
 
The importance of the democratic peace in western politics has had an effect on the structure 
of the world. It is suggested that the active inclusion of democratization policies as a foreign 
policy tool has created a new distinction, identifying an in-group of western liberal 
democracies and an out-group of illiberal or non-democratic regimes. A result of such a 
division could be a fierce social competition between the in-group and the out-group, and a 
perceived threat by the out-group feeling as a weaker minority.  
Important is to know what the effects are of such a policy on the out-group, the possible 
targets of democratization. The hypothesis that arises is that the out-group feels threatened by 
democratization policies of the in-group. If this hypothesis is to be true than this has serious 
implication for the use of democratization policies in international foreign policy. 
However, in light of the possibility of social competition between the in-group and the out-
group there could be an alternative explanation to the perceived threat. Namely, that the out-
group does not feel threatened by democratization policies, but by the capabilities and power 
of the leader of the in-group (the United States). After the Cold War, the United States has 
secured itself as a superpower at the international level. The reach of the United States is long 
                                                  
1 Reflected in for instance: National Security Strategy of B. Clinton (1995), G.W. Bush Jr. (2002), B. Obama 
(2015); the Preamble the Treaty of NATO (1949). European Security Strategy of 2003.   
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and powerful and this could easily threaten the out-group, fearing for an attack on their own 
status and independence.   
 
The purpose of this thesis is not to challenge the findings of democratic peace. Rather, it is to 
find if its inclusion in foreign policy has a negative effect on international stability.  
In the first part of this thesis the democratic peace theory will be discussed and how it came to 
be included in into the political sphere. To understand the research in the thesis a short part 
will be dedicated to the constructivist idea of threat perception in international relations. Also, 
the alternative hypothesis on the dominance of the United States will be addressed.  
For the research on the effects of democratization policies on the out-group I have chosen the 
case of Russia, an illiberal democracy. In the research a discourse analysis is conducted on 
international political speeches executed by the Russian political elite. In this discourse 
analysis it is researched if there is indeed proof of a division between ‘the West’ and ‘the 
East’, and Russia’s threat perception is analysed.  
In the concluding part of the thesis the results of the discourse analysis will be presented and 
interpreted, following by the conclusion if Russia – as the out-group – is threatened by ‘the 
West’ and if this threat can be attributed to interfering democratization policies of the West or 
to the capabilities of the United States.  
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Literature review and theoretical framework  
 
The democratic peace 
The democratic peace thesis originates from the work of Immanuel Kant's philosophical essay 
'A perpetual peace' [Zum ewigen Frieden, 1795]. In 1795, it was a philosophical thought that 
the universal establishment of states with a republican constitution could be the key to a 
reduction, or even an absence, of war (Hayes 2012, 767). A republican regime meant that the 
political elite had to get public consent to make certain decisions, as the decision to go to war. 
Kant argued that because of this necessary ‘public consent’, states are less inclined to go to 
war with other states and more prone to peace (Kant 1795, 68-70).  
Since the Cold War the democratic peace phenomenon was 'rediscovered' by scholars trying 
to find an empirical statistical relation between democracy and peace (Hayes 2012, 768; Babst 
1964). This happened because is this time there were a great amount of relatively new 
democracies and the established democracies became important world players (Babst 1964, 
10). One of the first researchers of the democratic peace is Babst, his statistical results 
concluded that elective governments have a positive effect on peace, thus a correlation 
between democracy and peace (Babst 1964, 14).  
In the 1990s research on the democratic peace focused on the theory of explaining why 
democracies do not fight each other (Hayes 2012, 769). Maoz and Russett (1993) outline two 
dominant explanations of the democratic peace theory, the structural model and the normative 
model.  
The structural model states that there is a structural constraint for democracies to wage wars, 
since political leaders need the domestic support of their population to act on international 
challenges; the democratic population is assumed to be against war because it results in high 
costs for them (Maoz and Russett 1993, 626).  
The normative model rests on the assumption that states externalize the democratic norms of 
behaviour that are developed within the democratic states. Also, when democratic and non-
democratic states clash, the non-democratic norms of behaviour dominate the democratic 
norms because of the anarchic international system (Maoz and Russett 1993, 625). 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
The inclusion of the democratic peace theory into political sphere 
Currently the democratic peace theory has a significant role in the foreign policy of important 
Western institutions. To understand the implications and effects of the inclusion of the 
democratic peace theory in foreign policy it is necessary to look how a philosophical thought 
can enter the public and political sphere.  
 
Using a political theory in practice could have implications due to a gap between theory and 
reality (Büger and Villumsen 2007, 420). Most often the gap is caused by a simplification of 
the literature, stripping the knowledge of International Relations of its scientific form when 
reaching the policy arena (Bürger and Villumsen 2007, 420).  
Political concepts are the building blocks for a political though - a political philosophy, 
theory, ideology. The way political concepts are interpreted defines what political theory 
follows (Ish-Shalom 2006, 568). The political thoughts, like philosophies and theories, 
present meaningful political concepts with a function to motivate the public to political action, 
thus perfect for political policy (Ish-Shalom 2006, 569). 
When a political theory has made its way into the public sphere it has a risk of becoming a 
'doxic' logic - a common belief (Ish-Shalom 2006, 571). Doxic knowledge can be seen as a 
conventional wisdom, though it could be true, it could also be false. The most dangerous of 
doxic logic is that it goes unchallenged and it is assumed to be true. Ish-Shalom (2006, 571) 
explains that losing the culture of critical questioning is the result of the process of theories 
moving to the public and political spheres. Bülger and Villumsen (2007, 431) also indicate 
this as a shift from a political thought to an objective statement; from a value to a fact. A 
doxic logic is taking into the political sphere by politicians that create policies according to 
well thought-out agenda. The best tactic to develop a winning policy is to incorporate existing 
public conventions to gain public support  (Ish-Shalom 2006, 572). 
 
A similar process happened when the democratic peace theory became included into US 
foreign policy. Two aspects were most important for moving the political thought of the 
democratic peace into the foreign policy of the US; the collective identity and self-image of 
the US and the end of the Cold War (Ish-Shalom 2006, 580).  
After the Cold War the US had a strong collective identity and self-image as a well-founded 
republic, and saw itself as the leader of the democratic world, with the important task to 
spread democracy around the world (Ish-Shalom 2006, 580). The combination of ideal and 
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material factors caused the transformation of the theoretical construct of the democratic peace 
into the public convention (Ish-Shalom 2006, 580).  
The end of the Cold War resulted in more support for liberal theories, as the Democratic 
Peace Theory. The American neoconservatives dealt with an existential crisis since the threat 
of communism was removed. Neoconservative thinkers that searched for a new rationale 
embraced the relatively new theory of democratic peace. These thinkers stated that promoting 
democracy abroad would not only be beneficial to the American moral values but also for the 
American strategic interests in foreign policy (Muravchik 1991). The identity crisis of the 
neoconservatives played an important role in the presidential campaign in 1992. President 
Bush Sr. had a strong foreign policy and therefore his challenger Bill Clinton focused on the 
economy. However, Bill Clinton did not leave foreign policy untouched and stressed the 
importance of promoting democracy abroad siding with the neoconservatives (Ish-Shalom 
2006, 581). This made democratization - based on the democratic peace theory - a campaign 
issue, politicizing and simplifying the theory of democratic peace (Ish-Shalom 2006, 582).  
 
The politics of democratization 
The politics of democratization is renationalised in terms of the democratic peace theory (Ish-
Shalom 2006, 582). Democratization as a key aspect in foreign policy is used to increase the 
number of democracies, to enlarge the zone of peace and stabilization.    
The two dominant explanations of the democratic peace aforementioned, are compatible with 
two types of democratization policies.  
The structural democratization policy puts emphasis on building the democratic structure, the 
formal and the procedural (Ish-Shalom 2006, 579; Piňeiro Chousa et al. 2005, 77). This policy 
indicates that democracy is a structure; easy to build, but also easy to destroy. The stability of 
these new democracies is not guaranteed (Ish-Shalom 2006, 578).  Usually this kind of 
democratization is focused on regime change, and is often accompanied by intervention with 
military force (Kegley and Hermann 1996). 
The normative democratization policy stresses the need of a society of individual citizens with 
democratic values and norms. The democratic norms, as tolerance and participation, and the 
culture of political rights are very important (Ish-Shalom 2006, 577). The normative 
explanation of the Democratic Peace is argued to be more stable and comprehensive once 
achieved, but the democratization policy is a really long process, with also ups and downs 
(Ericson 2000). 
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Western democratization policies  
After the Cold War the Democratic Peace became the norm as a security ideology
2
; thinking 
that the active promotion of democracy, through democratization, increased national and 
international security. The spread of the ideas of democratic peace and democratization 
policies became more evident in the Western world. This can be seen in the democratization 
policies of important western institutions, namely: The United States, the North-Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) , and the European Union (EU)
3
.  
 
No other country has used the democratic peace in its foreign policy as much as the United 
States. Since President Woodrow Wilson, who wanted "to make the world safe for 
democracy", presidential administrations have worked the promotion of democracy into their 
foreign policies (Epstein, Serafino and Miko 2007, 1). Since that time democracy has even 
become a source of American identity (Oren 1995, 148). President Clinton, in his National 
Security Strategy stated that there was no real gap between morality and interest in foreign 
policy, and that democratization will lead to an expansion of ‘the zone of peace’ (White 
House 1995). In this National Security Strategy the promotion of democracy was explicitly 
linked to security, stating that "The more that democracy and political and economic 
liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in countries of geostrategic importance to 
us, the safer our nation is likely to be" (White House 1995, 2).  
The structural understanding is more often used in US foreign policy than the normative 
understanding, focusing on the democratization of nations by building democratic institutions. 
This democratization policy made way for the practice of regime change, defining that policy 
as the only applicable policy to stabilize American security (Kegley and Hermann 1996; 
Burgos 2008, 222).  
 
The strategic concept of the NATO after the Cold War shows a great emphasis on democracy 
and democratization. This is clearly reflected in the preamble of the treaty from 1949. It states 
that "all parties are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of 
their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law" 
(NATO 1949). With the end of the Cold War, NATO refers more to democracy, especially in 
its policies concerning in Europe. It that time NATO begins its enlargement strategy to 
                                                  
2 Finding its inclusion in the National Security Strategies of president Bill Clinton (1995), George W. Bush Jr. 
(2002) and Barack Obama (2015).  
3 Found for example in the European Security Strategy of 2003.  
7 
 
include more Eastern and Central European states (Sjursen 2004, 691).  
Members of the NATO are required to take democratic principles and values into practice; 
with this requirement the enlargement of the NATO means enlarging the spread of democracy 
through membership (Sjursen 2004: 691). This could therefore be seen as an attempt in 
institutionalizing the democratic peace and democratization (Büger and Villumsen 2007, 
435). In addition there is the 'Partnership for Peace' (PfP) initiative where democratic states of 
the former Eastern bloc were invited to take part in. The NATO stated with this initiative that 
"… peace through democracy [is a] shared value […] fundamental to the Partnership" 
(NATO 1994).  
 
The European Union is made up out of liberal democracies, so the concept of democracy is 
also for the EU a source of social identity. In 1986 the promotion of democracy was reflected 
in a Statement on Human Rights, and it was less explicit than in the policies of the United 
States and the NATO (European Political Cooperation 1986). After the Cold War, the EU also 
believed there was a relation between democracy and development, human rights and conflict 
prevention. This is also visible in the European Security Strategy of 2003 where it is stated 
that the spread of democracy brought freedom and prosperity to many in the world (ESS 
2003). In the policies of the EU, however, the economic benefits of democratization and the 
benefits for further European integration were far more important (Olsen 2000, 144). As in 
NATO policies the area of interest was Eastern and Central Europe after the Cold War. The 
EU hoped that through the development of market democracies, the creation of a political 
democratic regime would follow. Also the 'Copenhagen criteria' for membership at the EU 
calls for, amongst other criteria, a stable democracy (Olsen 2000, 150).  
 
Social Identity Theory - 'us' versus 'them' 
The inclusion of democratization policies as a foreign policy tool has created a new 
distinction, identifying 'us', the West, and 'them', our enemies. Risse-Kappen (1995, 492) 
confirms this by saying that "democracies to a large degree create their enemies and their 
friends - 'them' and 'us' - by inferring either aggressive or defensive motives from the 
domestic structures of their counterparts". A psychological theory called the Social Identity 
Theory can help explain the creation of such dividing lines. The theory of Henri Tajfel
4
 
describes social identity as the subjective awareness of an individual that he or she belongs to 
                                                  
4 Rodriguez and Gurin refer to the literary work: Tajfel, H. 1978. ‘Differentiation between social groups: studies in the social 
psychology of intergroup relations’. London: Academic European Monographs in Social Psychology 
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a particular category (Rodriguez and Gurin 1990, 238). The theory further suggests that this 
social identity comes from a natural behaviour of categorization and comparison. Groups are 
formed as social categories and the members of those categories are treated as such, 
consequentially there is a differentiation between the groups to which they belong to and 
various out-groups (Rodriguez and Gurin 1990, 238). Also important is that once the 
distinction between the in-group and the out-group is defined, members of one group will 
always compare their group to the other one (Rodriguez and Gurin 1990, 238).  
 
The US sees itself as the leader of the democratic world, and other democratic states have 
accepted this as well (Ish-Shalom 2006, 580). The current definition of democracy can be 
perceived as a social construct to fit the US and its allies best and differentiate them from its 
enemies. The American characteristics lead to "a collective identification process among 
other actors of democratic states defining the in-group" (Wendt 1994). Rosato (2003, 599) 
might therefore have wondered if the regularity in International Relations of democracies not 
waging war with each other can be explained as "an imperial peace based on American 
power".  
Because of the shared democratic values with the US, other liberal states became part a 
collective identity [the in-group]. Accordingly, the out-group contain states that are very 
different from America, perceiving those states as the 'other' (Risse-Kappen 1995, 507; 
Rodriguez and Gurin 1990, 238).  
The doxic knowledge of the democratic peace after the Cold War normalized not only peace 
among democracies, but also violence between democracies and non-democracies, indirectly 
blaming this violence on the non-democracies (Büger and Villumsen 2007, 433). Meaning 
that the confidence in the democratic peace increased the uncertainty of the relations between 
democratic and non-democratic states. The use of democratic peace in foreign policy paved 
the way for applying intervention to spread democracy, which also became institutionalized in 
NATO strategy (Büger and Villumsen 2007, 438). The division between 'us' and 'them' - the 
in-group and out-group - could mean a deterioration of the relationship between democracies 
and non-democracies, or even illiberal democracies that are not in the in-group of 'America-
like' countries.  
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Threat perception 
The theory of threat perception is a constructivist account in International Relations (Hopf 
1998, 187). Threat perception is understood as "an anticipation of the part of an observer, the 
decision-maker, of impending harm to the state" (Cohen 1979, 4).  
But what makes this anticipation a threat? Davis
5
 defines a threat as a situation in which one 
party has the capability or the intention to inflict a negative outcome on another party 
(Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero 2007, 745). In International Relations the focus is on threats 
against collections of individuals, since it concerns states (Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero 
2007, 745). These threats can take the form of military threats, economic threats, or cultural 
threats (Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero 2007, 745). 
 
Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero (2007, 749) argue that the perception of threat is a function of 
the separation between the in-group and the out-group. State identities produce 
understandings of one another based on differences in identity and practice (Hopf 1998, 187). 
It was the way that the West perceived the Soviet Union as a communist threat that it became 
a new enemy. According to the social constructivist interpretation of the war involvement of 
democracies; perception is the starting point of it all (Risse-Kappen 1995, 503). The out-
group of western liberal democracies is a potential aggressor. Since they are more conflict-
prone, violence between democracies and non-democracies are blamed on non-democracies 
(Büger and Villumsen 2007, 433). Evidently, the out-group is perceived as a threat by 
'America-like' democracies. But how does the out-group perceive the in-group of 
democracies?  
The democratization policies of Western insinuations and states have caused a collective 
identity that is actively promoting democracy, sometimes with the use of forced regime 
change and accompanied by military force (Kegley and Hermann 1996). Can this frequently 
aggressive behaviour of democracies towards non-democracies be perceived as threatening to 
the out-group of non-democracies or illiberal states? 
 
Dominance of the United States 
An alternative hypothesis springs from the theory in Mearsheimer’s (2014) article “Why the 
Ukraine crisis is the West’s fault: The liberal delusions that provoked Putin” and from an 
article of Larson and Shevchenko (2014) “Russia says no: Power, status, and emotions in 
                                                  
5 Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero (2007) refer to the literary work: Davis, J.W. 2000. Threats and promises: The pursuit of 
international influence. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
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foreign policy”. The great power of the United States in international affairs, but also the 
stronghold on the West, has caused states to enter a form of social competition, trying to 
balance this power (Larson and Shevchenko 2014, 270). This could mean that the threat and 
animosity towards the West is not coming from an ideological founding but from a power 
based  point of view. 
This alternative is based on power balance in the international system and the historical 
animosity between Russia and the United States. In the Cold War the Soviet Union and 
America were the two superpowers in the international system. The Soviet Union took pride 
in that position, however this pride fell with the USSR (MacFarlane 2006, 46). Russia feels 
humiliated by its status and position in current international affairs and has the desire to rise 
up in status and position (Larson and Shevchenko 2014, 277).  
It could be well possible that the threat perceived by the out-group is not founded in 
ideological grounds but based on power. A threat of capabilities of the United States 
dominating the western hemisphere aspiring world supremacy.  
Social identity also plays a significant role in this theory. The West is then perceived as an 
orchestrated group under the rule of the United States. The nations that do not fit into this 
group of ‘American-like’ states are outsiders, known as the out-group. Emotions that go 
together with the deterioration of status could explain the intensity of competition (Larson and 
Shevchenko 2014, 2070), and could also explain the fear of losing this status in total, hence 
the perception of threat.  
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Research design  
6.1 Methodology 
This thesis explores the perception of the out-group. Western liberal democratic states 
(“America-like”) are the in-group, and non-western states that do not exercise a liberal 
democratic rule are the out-group. The research tries to find evidence if the out-group feels 
threatened by the in-group, and if so, why it perceives this threat.  
Perception is a social construct thus a research method that is in conformity with 
constructivism is necessary. To research the perception of a person or a group, the qualitative 
analysis of language is recommended. Language, also used in written texts, can be more than 
a medium through which research is conducted; it gives meaning and creates a frame in how 
we comprehend a discourse (Bryman 2012, 522 & 528).  
Discourse analysis (DA) is helpful in the research to social constructs as threat perception. 
DA recognizes that language is constructive and a way of accomplishing acts; it can attribute 
blame, constitute a view of social reality and present oneself in a certain manner (Bryman 
2012, 530). DA analysis is an appropriate method for this thesis since the aim is to find if the 
discourse of the out-group constitutes a threatened view of the in-group’s political policies.  
Potential disadvantages of DA is the risk of bias of the researcher and the difficulty of 
interpretation. Criticisers of DA say that the “discourse is made subservient to context not of 
the participants’ making, but of its analyst’s insistence” (Schegloff 1997 quoted in Bryman 
2012, 539). Such bias can be eliminated by introducing more analysts interpreting the texts, 
however this bachelor thesis does not have that kind of capacity.  
 
6.2 Case selection 
To research the threat perception of the out-group, the Russian Federation (hereafter Russia) 
is chosen as a case for the discourse analysis.  
Western democratization policies have had reasonable interference in the domestic (and 
foreign) affairs of foreign states that did not fit the picture of a liberal western democracy 
(Wickham 2004).   
In this thesis not only non-democratic regimes are included in the out-group but illiberal 
democratic regimes as well. Hybrid regimes and illiberal democracies are deviant from the in-
group and could also fall target to political interference or democratization policies of the in-
group.  
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The case of Russia is very interesting for the research on the effects of democratization 
policies. Russia knows a long history of animosity towards the USA and ‘the West’ due to the 
Cold War. This division between West and East, friend and foe, was most importantly an 
ideological one. After the collapse of the Soviet Union Russia started its transition to a 
democratic regime, however, Russia continues to struggle with this democratic political 
structure and adhering to the norms. Recent events in Georgia and Ukraine induce to research 
on the perception of Russia towards the West and western policies. An alternative hypothesis 
has risen due to the case of Russia’s animosity towards the USA. Russia could feel threatened 
by the American capabilities as the great power of the West.  
 
6.3 Data selection 
The focus lies on the socially constructed perception of Russia and how this is externalized to 
the rest of the world. The data used for research must therefore represent this externalization 
of the perception and opinion of the Russian political elite.  
The discourse analysis will rely on primary sources, taken from the speech and statement 
archive of the official website of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
6
. The speeches 
displayed in transcripts on the Russian governmental website are translated to English to be 
directly accessible to the foreign audience. International speeches given by the Russian 
political elite are analysed since they are delivered at international platforms, addressing the 
whole world. Those international speeches have the goal to express the perceptions of a 
nations; convey messages, transmit pressure, accusations, and desires. International speeches 
are thus the appropriate data to use in a research to a state’s perceptions.  
The timeframe is set to 2007-2016. This decision is grounded on the results in the dataset of 
POLITY IV
7
. After the Soviet Union collapsed the state went into a transitional period 
installing democratic rule. Obviously this process takes time and is not a good reflection on 
the level of democracy in Russia. The consolidated democracies of our time – the US, UK, 
and France – have a POLITY score of 10. In 2007, the level of democracy in the Russian 
Federation dropped, and the level of autocracy went up. It wound up to a score of 4 out of 10 
and this score has remained the same to date.  
The difference in POLITY scores between Russia and the consolidated liberal western 
democracies have been considerable in such a way that Russia can be seen as different to 
                                                  
6 <http://archive.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/english> 
7 An excerpt of the POLITY IV scores of Russia are included in the appendix.  
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those liberal western democracies. Russia is not an autocracy, but also not a full liberal 
democracy; an illiberal democracy. Morlino (2011, 59) even speaks of a ‘hybrid system’, 
portraying that Russia has autocratic characteristics as well as democratic characteristics.   
On the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there are many transcripts of different 
international events. Seen the capacity of a bachelor thesis not all data could be analysed. The 
speeches given at the Munich Security Conference were chosen as a justified sample of data 
in order to create the best discourse analysis on the threat perception of Russia.  
The Munich Security Conference (MSC) is an annual international conference with a large 
international platform, with participating nations from all continents. The main theme at this 
conference is security. Vladimir Putin himself said in his MSC 2007 speech that the 
conference gives him the opportunity to express freely and discuss problems and concerns 
more openly. If Russia feels threatened it will be in all probability discussed or at least 
mentioned at this conference on security.  
Russia is a regular participator at the annual conference, however not all speeches are found 
in the database of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Therefore the years 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012 
are not included in the research. For those years there was also no mentioning on the 
governmental website of Russia attending the MSC that year. Strangely, Russia did 
participate at the conference those years. In 2008, 2011 and 2012 speeches were given at the 
conference by a Russian delegate, according to the MSC agendas.  In 2009, Sergey Ivanov did 
not make a speech but he did attend the conference. Strangely no record was found of these 
attendances. 
 
6.4 Operationalization 
Prior to my research and in accordance to my theoretical framework I created two hypotheses 
that needed to be researched. 
Hypothesis 1: Russia perceives itself different from the in-group [“the West”], thus as 
the out-group.  
It is important to assess if Russia is an out-group in order to answer the research puzzle, 
namely if Russia as the out-group feels threatened by the in-group, and why 
  
 Hypothesis 2: Russia feels threatened by the in-group. 
According to the theoretical framework there could be two possible explanations for the 
Russian threat perception:  
14 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Russia feels threatened by the democratization policies and political 
interference of the in-group. 
Hypothesis 2b: Russia feels threatened by the political and military capabilities of the 
United States, as dominator of the in-group [“the West”].  
 
The unit of analysis is paragraphs in the discourse analysis, the choice of this unit is grounded 
in the importance of context in the speeches and this is lost if the unit of analysis was set at 
sentences.  
In the execution of discourse analysis codes are used to assist the analysis. These codes are 
words or word-groups that are eventually categorized in ‘coding categories’ or ‘themes’.  
The first codes were found deductively, corresponding to the first considerations of the 
researcher when reviewing the literature and theoretical framework.  
Examples of first considerations are: ‘the West’, ‘us versus them’ for hypothesis 1; 
‘democracy’, ‘domestic sovereignty’, ‘regime change’ for hypothesis 2a; ‘unipolarity’, ‘USA 
violations’ for hypothesis 2b.  
After the first review of the data recurrent codes and themes were found and this caused 
additional coding categories, created inductively from the data. An example of such a theme 
is ‘International law’, in the results this theme is discussed as a separate finding.  
The use of words conveying an emotion or attitude are important in analysing threat 
perception. An example for this is ‘western partners’, it conveys a cooperative attitude 
because of the word ‘partner’. However, it also refers to the division of the world; the social 
identity of the speaker is different from ‘the West’, hence ‘western partners’.  
Sometimes the emotion of a written text is hard to assess. The context and words help 
determine the tone of a paragraph. For example word like ‘willing’, ‘cooperation’, ‘hope’ 
express a cooperative attitude.  
 
After the second review of the data the codes were categorized into themes that structured the 
findings of the analysis and could be connected to the hypotheses. Eventually the theme of 
‘Social Identity’ relates to hypothesis 1. And the second theme ‘Threat perception’ relates to 
hypothesis 2 and the two possible explanations for threat perception (H2a and H2b)  
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Results and analysis 
Table 1 presents a general view of the speeches that are used for analysis. There are a several 
deviations in word count and number of paragraphs between the speeches. The speech of 
2007, given by Vladimir Putin at the Munich Security Conference of 2007 longer than the 
others. This is due to the short discussion with questions from the audience that followed the 
speech. For the samples
8
 including questions, the words of the enquirer are measured in Table 
1 but are not analysed in the discourse analysis.  
Like discussed in the data selection considerations the years 2008, 2009, 2011 and 2012 are 
missing from the discourse analysis. For these years no record was found of participating in 
the conference. Although a transcript of the speech of Sergey Ivanov from 2008 was found on 
another source on the internet, it could not be used for this research since the parameters of 
the data selection were set on the accessibility of transcripts of the official website of the 
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For the missing years no press releases are available that 
Russian delegates attended the conference and there was even no mentioning of the 
conference, different from the other years where it was greatly broadcasted. Apparently 
Russian political elite did not want to give access to these speeches or else it would have been 
transcribed, translated, and presented on their website.  
 
TABLE 1 
STATISTICS OF SAMPLE SPEECHES  
Statistical item Statistics 
2007 2010 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Words 8.736 2.065 2.194 3.687 4.478 2.589 
Paragraphs 136 28 25 36 47 21 
Paragraph mean 
length 
64,24 73,75 87,76 102,42 95,28 123,29 
 
The analysis aims to give evidence for two hypotheses, whereby the second hypothesis could 
have two explanations. The first hypothesis: Russia perceives itself different from western 
liberal democracies [the in-group], so as an out-group. Is connected to the theme ‘social 
identity', showing the references to a 'them versus us' feeling in the speeches.  
If Russia indeed perceives itself as an out-group it must be researched if Russia [as the out-
group] feels threatened by the in-group
9
 and why
10
, this is researched in ‘threat perception’. 
                                                  
8 Samples of 2007 and to a lesser extent in 2014, 2015, 2016.  
9 Hypothesis 2. 
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A. Social identity - Demarcation of the world 
Social identity is an essential part in the creation of the threat perception. Social identity is 
formed from a perceived membership of a social group; there is an in-group and also an out-
group. So before the origin of the Russian threat perception can be assessed, it must first be 
proven that Russia indeed perceives itself as an out-group to the West. Hypothesis 1 assumes 
that Russia feels part of the out-group to the in-group of western liberal democracies.  
References to such a perception are for example found in the codes of ‘dividing lines’, ‘we’, 
‘they’, ‘separation’, ‘the West’. In the theme of social identity the distinction is made between 
two possible perceptions. The subtheme ideology contain references towards ‘the West’ as 
ideological bloc. And the subtheme power contains references towards ‘the West’ as pawn of 
the United States.  
These two subthemes also relate to the two theories of the theoretical framework. References 
to differences in ideology are related to the theory of hypothesis 2a; that Russia feels 
threatened by the political interference by the in-group to impose their ideology. References 
to the American influence over the West as a social group, relates to the theory of hypothesis 
2b; that Russia feels threatened by the military capabilities of the United States.  
 
TABLE 2 
SOCIAL IDENTITY REFERENCES 
Sample speech Total number Ideology Power  
2007 8 7 1 
2010 7 5 - 
2013 8 5 2 
2014 7 5 - 
2015 14 9 5 
2016 4 2 1 
Total 
 
NO 48 33 9 
% 100 68,75 18,75 
 
Some remarks that fit into the overall theme of social identity did not make a direct reference 
to one of the subthemes; it is therefore that two totals of ideology and power do not add up to 
a full 100 per cent.  
 
                                                                                                                                                           
10 Hypothesis 2a and hypothesis 2b. 
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An example of this is found in the speech of Sergey Lavrov in 2014:  
 "Important documents which had set the goal to create a common European, 
European Atlantic and Eurasian security community were adopted at these forums. 
We still have this goal, nobody has cancelled it, however it seems that we are not 
moving towards it very fast – many people even say that there is movement, yet it is in 
the other direction." 
 
This piece of text indicates an acknowledgement of the division in the European, Euro-
Atlantic community. However, no indication is given whose fault this is, or why it happened.  
It is therefore categorized as a remark on the division in the Euro-Atlantic community and not 
labelled to the subtheme 'ideological' or 'power'.  
 
In all speeches there have been references to the demarcation in the world. Only in the speech 
of Vladimir Putin at the MSC 2007 two remarks were made that gave strong evidence against 
hypothesis 1. Those two remarks were made in an answer to a question about the "unipolar 
nature of the Russian government"
11
. Putin commented on the transitional process of the 
Russian political structure becoming a strong and mature multiparty system. Implying that 
Russia is strongly trying to become a liberal democracy as the in-group, seeing itself as an 
aspirant member of the in-group and not necessarily as a member of the out-group.   
 
Also necessary to research is the additional recurrent subject in the speeches: 'cooperation'. 
This theme fits into the research of hypothesis 1 since it can be seen as a variation to the 
assumption that Russia feels as an out-group, but also it could be seen as an acknowledgement 
of the division between the in-group and the out-group. In Table 3 below, the references to 
cooperation are reviewed. Some references defy the assumption of Russia being part of the 
out-group, implying that Russia is on the same side of the social demarcation line as the in-
group. Some references are in support of hypothesis 1; Russia acknowledges the division 
between in-group and out-group but wants to overcome this to strengthen its own security.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
11 Putin, V. 2007. Speech at the 43rd Munich Security Conference, 2007.  
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TABLE 3 
COOPERATION REFERENCES 
Sample speech Total number Supports H1 Defies H1 
2007 7 1 6 
2010 4 3 1 
2013 7 2 5 
2014 10 5 5 
2015 4 1 3 
2016 3 3 - 
Total 
 
NO 35 15 20 
% 100 42,86 57,14 
 
Remarks on cooperation that were accompanied by a negative, accusing or disappointed tone 
were usually in favour of hypothesis 1. These remarks included failed attempts of cooperation 
due to differences, or accusations of lack in willingness of the in-group.  
Most cooperation requests were made towards the international community as a whole, and in 
relation to global issues as global terrorism and the joint efforts in Syria. Still, the most 
remarks (57,14%) relating to cooperation did defy the assumption of Russia being an out-
group.  
 
Concluding from the results presented in Table 2 and Table 3 it can be said that there is strong 
evidence supporting that Russia does perceive itself as a member of a different group than the 
West. Most remarks on cooperation defied the assumption of hypothesis 1, meaning 
cooperation made successful efforts to overcome the perceived division between Russia and 
the in-group. However, looking at the overall results of Table 2 and Table 3 more evidence 
points in favour of hypothesis 1
12
.  
Defying remarks are shown in the second column of Table 3, and two separate remarks in the 
speech of 2007 directly denied the assumption. In comparison this gives 66 remarks in favour 
of the hypothesis and 22 remarks in disfavour of the hypothesis. Concluding that more 
evidence collected from the data points to hypothesis 1; that Russia feels a member of the out-
group to the West.  
References in relation to ideology were more frequent than the references to power. These 
subthemes related to the two theories. Ideology relates to the theory that ideological 
                                                  
12 All results of Table 2 and the first column of Table 3 are in support of the assumption that Russia feels part of 
the out-group. 
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differences are the main reason of the division between the in-group and the out-group. Power 
relates to the theory that the dominant role of the United States over the West is the main 
reason of the division between the in-group and the out-group.  
Looking at the results from Table 2 it can be assumed that Russia perceives ideological 
differences between the in-group and the out-group, operationalized as 'West versus East', to 
be the main reason for the existing division in the world.  
 
 B. Threat Perception 
Hypothesis 2 assumes that Russia [as member of the out-group] feels threatened by the in-
group. In every speech of the data selection remarks have been made on Russian security and 
what is considered as threatening. Meaning that Russia does externalize threat perception in 
its international speeches. According to the theoretical framework there are two possible 
explanations causing the Russian threat perception. These two theories are reflected in two 
hypotheses.  
 
Hypothesis 2a: Russia feels threatened by the democratization policies and political 
interference of the in-group. 
Hypothesis 2b: Russia feels threatened by the military capabilities and intentions of the 
United States, the leader of the in-group. 
 
Hypothesis 2a assumes that the threat perception of Russia is grounded in ideological and 
political differences  between the in-group and the out-group. Whereas, hypothesis 2b 
assumes that the threat perception of Russia is grounded in the power position of the United 
States in the West, and the difficult American-Russian relationship.  
 
The theme ‘Threat Perception’ in this discourse analysis will try to find the reasons of the 
perceived threat of Russia. First some explanation is necessary on the operationalization of 
this part of the analysis.  
Possible threatening subjects were not always accompanied by a threatened attitude in the 
paragraph. Some references were made in a tone of discontent or concern. Considering the 
setting and audience of the Munich Security Conference this does not directly mean some 
threat references are not sincere. Not attributing blame or a threatened tone to a comment does 
not necessarily mean it is not an expression of perceived threat. It is therefore that expressions 
of perceived threat and security concerns are combined into one theme: threat perception.  
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An example comes from a speech of Sergey Lavrov, 2014: 
 “The accumulation of elements of instability and chaos in economics and politics 
makes me draw a parallel with the development of events at the beginning of the XX 
century and between wars not only on the European, but also on a global scale. We 
need to remember where attempts to ensure personal security at the expense of the 
security of others, the following of narrow egoistic interests, and the logics of national 
exclusiveness, can lead us to.” 
 
This paragraph has a cautious tone and it expresses a concern for the future of Russian 
security and global security. Still, the language used in this paragraph is strong and accusing 
towards the ‘ones’ responsible for this instability of security. It can become a more pertinent 
threat in the future, or it might be too political incorrect to attribute more blame to a specific 
party. This paragraph is seen as a security concern but is included into the theme of threat 
perception.  
 
As with the previous theme, threat perception is divided in subthemes. The subthemes 
correspond to the reason for threat perception or type of threat. The subthemes that relate to 
ideological or political differences – in accordance with hypothesis 2a – are ‘ideological’ and 
‘political interference’. The subthemes that correspond to the capabilities of the United States 
and its power in the West – supporting hypothesis 2b – are ‘material/military’ and 
‘international system’.  
References that will be labelled as an “ideological threat” are for instance threatened 
comments on the expansion policy of the NATO towards the East, with an immediate 
reference to the differences between West and East. These references give strong support for 
hypothesis 2a. 
 
An example of such a comment is taken from the speech of Vladimir Putin, 2007: 
“I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with 
the modernisation of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. 
On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual 
trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? 
And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution 
of the Warsaw Pact?”   
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References that fit into the subtheme of political interference will be accusing or negative 
comments on imposing a regime change, or foreign interference in domestic affairs. Imposing 
such changes in foreign countries stands in direct relation with western democratization 
policies. A comment as “[…] not imposing an outside value scale, but acknowledging the 
variety of development models” (Lavrov 2013) will be labelled as a threat of political 
interference. 
Military and material threats concern references to weapon systems, missile defence systems 
and clear references to other military capacity. These types of threats are more openly 
discussed since they are more visible to the rest of the international community. Usually the 
expressed threats concern American capabilities and uncertainty about their intentions. It is 
therefore that these threats connect to the hypothesis 2b.  
Threats related to international system are comments that express a concern about the 
dominance of American power in the international community and especially the western 
hemisphere. In these remarks references are made to a ‘unipolar system’ in favour of the 
United States. This subtheme gives support to hypothesis 2b.  
 
TABLE 4 
THREAT PERCEPTION REFERENCES 
Sample speech Type of Threat 
Total number 
 
Ideological  Political 
interference 
Material/military International 
system 
2007 42 4 9 12 9 
2010 4 2 . . . 
2013 8 1 4 2 1 
2014 8 . 3 2 2 
2015 19 3 6 6 4 
2016 6 1 2 . 3 
Total 
 
NO 87 11 24 22 19 
% 100 12,64 27,59 25,29 21,84 
 
According to the results from Table 4 most threats expressed by the Russian political elite are 
related to a fear of political interference. As explained earlier, references to political 
interference are supporting evidence for hypothesis 2a, assuming that the Russian threat 
perception is grounded in ideological and political differences between the in-group and the 
22 
 
out-group. Remarks with a fear of political interference were frequently accompanied by a 
‘concerned tone’. This possibly means that this type of threat is less accepted to be openly 
discussed.  
 
The overall results of Table 4 point out more evidence for hypothesis 2b; that Russia feels 
threatened by the military capabilities and intentions of the United States, as leader of the in-
group
13
. The difference between the occurrence of supporting references to hypothesis 2a and 
supporting references to hypothesis 2b is not substantial to ultimately reject hypothesis 2a. 
The results only have a few variations; meaning, there is proper evidence for both hypotheses.  
It must also be considered that Russia has democratic characteristics and it will most likely 
externalize their support for democratic values. This might also mask the fear for political 
interference, claiming that interference in Russian affairs is not necessary because it has a 
democratic structure just like the in-group. Ideological and political threats are less openly 
discussed than military and material threats. Military and material threats are more exposed to 
the world, it is not remarkable that physical threats are discussed more openly. It also portrays 
Russia as a victim of the poser of the threat, in this case the West.      
 
C. International law  
International law is a frequent repeated subject in the speeches, so this subject was later added 
to the analysis as a theme. The theme of international law is included in the analysis as a 
separate finding to analyse what its recurrence could mean for this research.  
The references to international law still relate to a security concern, and thus a possible threat.  
Usually the comments relating to international law were an appeal for a stricter legal 
framework and indicated a concern for the stability of Russian or global security.  
Some references to international law were grounded in a specific reason of concern and could 
be categorized in concern for international interference and a concern of strong unilateralism 
in the world.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
13 The results of “material/military” and “international system” combined give supporting results to hypothesis 
2b 
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TABLE 5 
INTERNATIONAL LAW REFERENCES 
Sample 
speech 
Reason of concern 
Total number Political interference  Unilateralism 
2007 6 - - 
2010 3 - 1 
2013 4 2 2 
2014 4 2 1 
2015 3 2 - 
2016 - - - 
Total NO 20 6 5 
 % 100 30 25 
 
 
The subthemes political interference and unilateralism are very similar to the threat types 
political interference and international system. Political interference supports the assumption 
of hypothesis 2a, and unilateralism supports the assumption of hypothesis 2b.  
 
For instance, an example of a comment that fits into international law and the subtheme 
political interference is given in the speech of Sergey Lavrov, 2015:  
"Firstly, we share the UN Charter, which proclaimed the principles of sovereign 
equality, non-interference in domestic affairs, settlement of all disputes in a peaceful 
way, inadmissibility of the use of force or threat of force." 
 
The leading theme is evidently international law. But the recital of the principles of 
‘sovereign equality’, ‘non-interference in domestic affairs’, do highlight the underlying 
concern; a fear of political interference.  
 
Results presented in Table 5 are very close together, it only differs one reference in six 
speeches. Objectively there are more references to political interference and thus supporting 
hypothesis 2a, however, this difference is so small it can be deemed negligible.   
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Discussion and conclusion  
The results from the analysis supports hypothesis 1; Russia accepts that it belongs to another 
category than the West, thus perceiving the West as another social group. Although this was 
not necessarily a surprising outcome it was needed to be proven or else hypothesis 2a and 
hypothesis 2b could not be true.  
The analysis on the causes of threat perception only gave a slight difference in the results. 
Ultimately there were more references made in support of hypothesis 2b, assuming that the 
Russian threat perception is grounded in the power position of the United States in the West, 
and the American-Russian relationship. The results in favour of hypothesis 2a – Russia feels 
threatened by the democratization policies and political interference of the in-group – are off 
by six references in six speeches in comparison to results in favour of hypothesis 2b. This 
difference is really small and is not substantial enough to strongly conclude what the main 
reason is behind the Russian threat perception. Results from the analysis give supporting 
evidence for both hypotheses.   
It must be considered that comments on tangible threats as military capabilities are easier to 
make at a security conference than comments on less visible threats related to a difference in 
ideology. The fact that more remarks were made supporting hypothesis 2b does not mean 
ideological threats and the fear of foreign political interference in Russian affairs are 
consequentially less threatening or important to Russia.  
In advance of the research, when making the theoretical framework, I expected to find strong 
evidence in favour of hypothesis 2a. It was only after considering the history of the American-
Russian relationship that the second and actually alternative hypothesis 2b was formulated. 
Beforehand it was expected that research to the perception of a state, especially one as 
ambiguous as Russia, would be difficult. However, it was also imagined to find more direct 
references to democratization policies and to animosity towards the West as an ideological 
bloc, as described in the theoretical framework of this thesis.  
It is nevertheless not surprising that a tangible military threat presented as more directly in the 
international speeches. Also, Russia is an illiberal democracy so it was uncertain if such a 
state would perceive western democratization policies as a direct threat; Russia does convey a 
strong belief in democracy at the international level.  
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The fact that there were many references towards political interference, differences in 
ideology and sometimes direct mentioning of democracy, does give an indication that 
hypothesis 2a is still a possibility to be reckoned with. The constant reference to international 
law, and the discomfort of the installation of regime changes and political interference in 
favour of the promotion of democracy, does show there is an uneasiness of being different 
from the in-group. May that be as an illiberal democracy, a hybrid system, or an authoritarian 
regime. The research did establish evidence that Russia perceives a clear division in the world 
to which Russia is a victim of, because it does feel threatened.  
 
Political speeches have a degree of ambiguity adhering to ‘political correctness’. At 
conferences this level is supposed to be lower than at for instance a meeting of the United 
Nations General Assembly. The use of the speeches of the Munich Security Conference did 
supply the right data, and it is a good medium to externalize the Russian perceptions. It is the 
difficulty of interpreting the perceptions that give less reliable results.  
This is also a potential pitfall in this research project. The research of this thesis consisted out 
of only one researcher, therefore only one interpretation of six speeches. When analysing 
speeches and perceptions, the opinions and feelings of the ‘speech giver’ are very important. 
Sometimes real opinions and feelings are not adequately conveyed or omitted due to the 
exposure of the speech. In an ideal situation this research should have been done by more 
‘coders’ that independently read and interpret the speeches, giving the results to an analyst 
that can conduct the analysis of the results.    
 
Since there has been evidence that support both hypothesis 2a and hypothesis 2b it is 
worthwhile to  engage in further research. If hypothesis 2a can be proven in other cases it 
would have great consequences for the political policies of the West; something that is 
supposed to bring more stability and peace to the world could be seen as threatening to others. 
It could be of value to this research to include other cases in the discourse analysis. Russia has 
a special relationship with the United States, has a prominent international status, and has 
democratic characteristics in its political system. Research including another illiberal 
democracy without the international status of Russia, or an autocracy, could give more clarity 
on the effects of western democratization policies on the out-group.  
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